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Chapter 6 - The Public’s Health
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp 183-216
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The Peanut Corporation of America
I think that the F.D.A. has not been able to catch some of these things as quickly as I expect. … At bare minimum, we should be able to count on our government keeping our kids safe when they eat peanut butter. That’s what Sasha eats for lunch probably three times a week. And, you know, I don’t want to have to worry about whether she’s going to get sick as a consequence of having her lunch.
President ObamaIf someone is convicted of a felony in the criminal justice system, they go to prison and are not allowed to vote. But, if you poison Americans via their food supply what are the consequences? You pay a fine and keep producing? Is this right? Is this what we as Americans want?
Peter Hurley, police officer, Portland, Oregon and father of surviving salmonella-poisoned childTeam Diarrhea’s Discovery
In the fall of 2008, Minnesota public health officials were alarmed by an unusually high number of illnesses and deaths caused by salmonella poisoning. This outbreak of foodborne disease, one of the largest in history, ultimately resulted in the deaths of 9 people and sickened 714. Twenty-three percent of those made ill were hospitalized and half of the ill were young children. Medical experts who have studied the incident say that even these high numbers likely underestimate the outbreak’s impact because salmonellosis remains a significantly underreported disease. They say that the number of illnesses and deaths could be as much as 16 times more than reported.
Introduction
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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On April 5, 2010, an enormous explosion tore through Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine in Montcoal, West Virginia, propelling flames at a speed of one thousand feet per second in all directions from the point of ignition as far as two miles underground. Twenty-nine men were killed instantly in the worst mine disaster in four decades. Numerous blatant and well-known violations of mine safety laws caused the explosion, from the chronic buildup of highly combustible methane to the malfunctioning equipment that produced the igniting spark. In the weeks leading up to the accident, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) officials had ordered the evacuation of Upper Big Branch on three separate occasions because excessive methane made the mine too dangerous to work. Despite these efforts to nudge Massey back into line with safety requirements, 13,000 citations for illegal conduct throughout the industry were pending before MSHA at the time, including several hundred involving the Upper Big Branch mine, because the agency was paralyzed by its own dysfunctional system for enforcing these requirements.
To his great credit, Booth Goodwin, West Virginia’s top federal prosecutor, filed criminal charges against four Massey employees, including three relatively low-level supervisors and the senior manager of the subsidiary responsible for the Upper Big Branch mine. The senior manager, David C. Hughart, is cooperating with Goodwin, and hopeful rumors circulate in neighboring communities that Don Blankenship, Massey’s notorious chief executive officer, is the ultimate target of the investigation. If Blankenship is indicted and either pleads guilty or is tried, the case will be the first in decades to travel up the chain of command to the person who was ultimately responsible for the catastrophe.
Frontmatter
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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Why Not Jail?
- Industrial Catastrophes, Corporate Malfeasance, and Government Inaction
- Rena Steinzor
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The US Department of Justice is under fire for failing to prosecute banks that caused the 2008 economic meltdown because they are too big to jail. Prosecutors have long neglected to hold corporate executives accountable for chronic mistakes that kill and injure workers and customers. This book, the first of its kind, analyzes five industrial catastrophes that have killed or sickened consumers and workers or caused irrevocable harm to the environment. From the Texas City refinery explosion to the Upper Big Branch mine collapse, the root causes of these preventable disasters include crimes of commission and omission. Although federal prosecutors have made a start on holding low-level managers liable, far more aggressive prosecution is appropriate as a matter of law, policy, and justice. Written in accessible and jargon-free language, this book recommends innovative interpretations of existing laws to elevate the prosecution of white-collar crime at the federal and state levels.
Part One - The Status Quo
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp 11-14
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The Status Quo
The arduous transition to an industrial economy in Europe and North America brought with it considerable improvement in overall social welfare. Populations increased by orders of magnitude, life expectancy was extended, and a middle class emerged as an alternative to landed gentry, introducing the powerful idea that hard work could improve social status and quality of life. Nevertheless, the harsh underbelly of this remarkable transformation included grave and avoidable suffering. Worker fatalities in hazardous industries such as mining were common, children labored under unspeakably bad conditions, and consumers were prey to hawkers of bad medicine and worse food. Government intervention to control the hazards to health and safety lagged several decades behind the Industrial Revolution, a pattern that persists to this day with respect to the innovations and emerging threats of industrialization in a global economy.
Chapter 7 - Institutionalized Recklessness
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp 223-252
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The guys who built the Pintos had kids in college who were driving that car. Believe me, no one sits down and thinks: “I’m deliberately going to make this car unsafe.”
Lee Iacocca, former CEO Chrysler CorporationFor most managers, especially for those who are ambitious, the real meaning of work – the basis of social identity and valued self-image – becomes keeping one’s eye on the main chance, maintaining and furthering one’s own position and career. This task requires, of course, unrelenting attentiveness to the social intricacies of one’s organization.
Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate ManagersWith other violent crimes we tend to seek explanations as to why people turn to violence – and often use terms like deranged, psychotic, drugged, psychopathic, pathological and other concepts from the vocabulary of severe psychiatric disturbances – and also demand severe punishment … for offenders. Managers, in contrast are ostensibly normal and their decision-making takes place in the board-rooms of companies where well-educated and well-groomed (and arguably “well-balanced”) executives debate business decisions on the basis of strategic, marketing, financial and other considerations. … Presumably no one is fully aware that they are planning death. And yet companies do end up killing and maiming people. Feelings of justice should surely dictate that responsibility will be located at the point where decisions were made, that the corporate officials concerned will be prosecuted, and that they and/or the company will be heavily punished.
Maurice Punch, Suite Violence: Why Managers Murder and Corporations Kill
Acknowledgments
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp ix-x
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Chapter 4 - The Workplace
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp 105-148
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BP’s Texas City Refinery
It was typical of them to experience a fire every week, on average. A fire every week is a warning sign that something is critically wrong at the facility.
Mike Sawyer, independent process safety consultant for BPThe question for any company is how good they are at managing through two inevitable barriers: the position paradox and the “check the box” mentality. Texas City is at high risk on these two counts. Position paradox: The people who have the most influence over the decisions that determine the safety and integrity management of a particular site are almost always the most distanced from those conditions. Unless managed, the result is blindness for the senior-most level of the site as well as those above the site. BP as a corporation has had this blindness and Texas City is no exception.
The Telos Group, in a report written before the explosionBP on Tuesday placed the lion’s share of the blame for the deadly blast at its Texas City refinery at the feet of low- and mid-level workers who it said were lax in following written company procedures during one of the most dangerous times in refinery operations. Had the six operators and one supervisor assigned to the start-up of the refinery’s so-called isomerization unit been doing their jobs, the explosion would not have happened … said Ross Pillari, president of BP Products North America.
Anne Belli and Terri Langford, Houston Chronicle, reporting May 18, 2005The 52,000 Gallon Geyser
On March 23, 2005, a massive explosion at BP’s Texas City refinery killed fifteen people and injured 200, 170 seriously. The blast was so forceful that it damaged houses three-quarters of a mile from the plant. Emergency responders ordered 43,000 people in the neighborhoods surrounding the 1,200 acre site to “shelter in place,” meaning that they were directed to go into their homes, seal windows and doors, and remain inside until the all-clear. The incident is considered one of the worst industrial accidents in American history.
Part Two - The Lessons of Catastrophe
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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“Accidents” and Institutional Failure
The gradual demise of the regulatory system has left major manufacturing sectors adrift. Some operate without any meaningful regulatory oversight. Others are blanketed with detailed regulatory requirements but, on the rare occasions when inspectors show up to check compliance, enforcement actions are erratic and unpredictable and penalties are relatively low. These circumstances provide the owners and operators of plants and production sites with strong incentives to avoid substantial investments in upfront compliance costs, especially safety and pollution control equipment. Instead, they consciously take the risk of waiting to see if they will be caught. Admittedly, that outcome would be unpleasant, but it is also one that seems increasingly unlikely. Compounding the challenge of motivating compliance is the reality that the national political environment is dominated by angry allegations that overregulation is killing the nation’s economy. The spectacle of Obama administration political appointees appearing before disdainful House Republicans further suggests that companies may self-regulate as they see fit.
Chapter 8 - Deferred Prosecution Agreements
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp 253-276
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Whether the [DOJ] needs a middle ground between prosecution and declination [of a case] is far from clear. … The evolution of the Justice Department’s approach to deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, however, is best described as a policy in search of a rationale.
David Uhlmann, former chief, DOJ Environmental Crimes SectionCorporations suffer a peculiar vulnerability. The rules of criminal liability allow federal and state prosecutors to unduly punish those corporations that fall within their crosshairs. But the recent emergency of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to force major changes in corporate governance should give pause to even the most ardent populist.
Richard Epstein, Professor, New York University Law SchoolWhat has intensified under your watch is a pervasive system of double standards: tough criminal penalties and lifetime stigma for individual street criminals, but second (and third chances) for corporate criminals that promise to do better in the future. The double standard is all the worse because it contradicts and undermines the basic purposes of the criminal justice system – deterrence and punishment – for the very actors for whom such objectives make the most sense. Because corporations coldly calculate costs and benefits – undertaking careful and detailed risk assessments as a fundamental part of their intentional decision-making process – they are most likely to be responsive to hard-hitting penalties, not fines easily integrated and transferred into the “cost of doing business.”
Ralph Nader, founder, and Robert Weissman, president, Public Citizen
Chapter 3 - Cons and Pros
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp 66-94
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What a community chooses to punish and how severely tells us what (or whom) it values and how much. That members of the public understand punishment to have this signification is confirmed by the familiar complaint that an insufficiently severe punishment endorses the criminal’s behavior and devalues his victim. …
… A theory of criminal-law policy that abstracts from social meaning – by, say, reducing the value of all policies solely to their cost effectiveness in deterring crime – will generate morally uncompelling, and hence politically naïve, prescriptions.
Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of CrimeLegal Commentator Opposition and Social Scientist Support
Two discrete groups of commentators – the first from the legal academy and the second from the closely connected disciplines of sociology and criminology – have dominated the policy debate over the merits of prosecuting corporations and individuals for white collar crimes. Surprisingly, after extensive research I have not uncovered much collaboration between the two groups and I believe this book is the first to juxtapose their insights.
A prolific group of business-oriented legal academics argues that white collar criminal prosecutions are unfair and ineffective, especially with respect to corporations. The gist of their position is that corporations are paper entities that lack minds capable of formulating the guilty intent (mens rea) considered as an indispensable element of criminal culpability. Because the largest corporations have complex management structures and depend on the activities of many employees, no single executive – or even a committee of executives – is able to police everyone’s conduct. Individuals may well violate the criminal law, but most often they engage in such behavior contrary to official corporate policy. Criminal prosecutions impose considerable stigma and can result in grave and disproportionate damage to the corporation’s profitability. Therefore, such charges are both unfair to innocent bystanders such as the company’s stockholders and unwise in all but the most egregious circumstances. Instead, the government and the public at large should rely on civil actions to recoup any damages caused by rogue agents.
Part Three - Solutions
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- Why Not Jail?
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- 28 November 2014, pp 217-222
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Judge Rakoff’s Lament
In a short essay that sent shockwaves through the contentious world of prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, and corporate counsels, federal district court Judge Jed Rakoff wondered recently why no bank executives have been prosecuted for causing the 2008 economic meltdown. Rakoff, considered a maverick by his friends and an iconoclast by his foes, noted that the five-year statute of limitations (deadline) for such prosecutions would soon arrive. Careful to acknowledge that he is not privy to all the facts, the judge nevertheless managed to skewer prosecutorial timidity while professing sardonic bewilderment:
I have no opinion whether any given top executive had knowledge of the dubious nature of the underlying [subprime] mortgages, let alone fraudulent intent.
But what I do find surprising is that the Department of Justice should view the proving of intent as so difficult in this case. Who, for example, was generating the so-called “suspicious activity reports” of mortgage fraud that, as mentioned, increased so hugely in the years leading up to the crisis? Why, the banks themselves. A top-level banker, one might argue, confronted with growing evidence from his own and other banks that mortgage fraud was increasing, might have inquired why his bank’s mortgage-based securities continued to receive AAA ratings. And if, despite these and other reports of suspicious activity, the executive failed to make such inquiries, might it be because he did not want to know what such inquiries would reveal?
This, of course, is what is known in the law as “willful blindness” or “conscious disregard.” It is a well-established basis on which federal prosecutors have asked juries to infer intent, including in cases involving complexities, such as accounting rules, at least as esoteric as those involved in the events leading up to the financial crisis.
Index
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp 277-283
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Chapter 2 - White Collar Crime Today
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp 40-65
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Thus criminal justice tells us where the moral boundaries are, where the line lies between good and bad. It patrols those boundary lines, day and night, rain or shine. It shows the rules directly, dramatically, visually through asserting and enforcing them. (There are lessons from non-enforcement, too: from situations where the boundaries are indistinct, or the patrol corrupt or asleep; and society is quick to learn these lessons, too.)
Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American HistoryWhite Collar Neglect
American law provides federal and state prosecutors with powerful authority to charge individuals and corporations with crimes and to win, but they rarely pursue such cases. This paradox is especially poignant with respect to criminality that kills or injures workers or consumers, or that causes irretrievable damage to natural resources. Prosecutors have largely turned a blind eye to such violations, depending instead on a broken regulatory system to deter illegal behavior. To be sure, some of the criminal statutes that apply to health and safety offenses treat them lightly: purveyors of tainted food or grossly negligent employers face misdemeanor charges providing for prison terms of a year or less. Rather than working to develop cases that overcome these weaknesses by, for example, charging multiple violations that add up to significant jail time, prosecutors have largely abandoned those fields.
One conundrum running throughout the field of neglected criminal enforcement is whether to charge corporations or their employees. The decision is admittedly complex, but forgoing enforcement altogether should not be a third and favored option. As a matter of principle, corporations should be subject to prosecution when the violations were endemic to the corporate structure, as opposed to the brainchild of isolated, rogue employees. Individuals can and should be charged alongside their corporate employers, providing a different kind of deterrent to future malfeasance.
Contents
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp v-viii
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Chapter 1 - Regulatory Dysfunction
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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When a jury last week found a former suburban Chicago water department chief guilty of 11 charges related to mixing contaminated well water into a town’s drinking water supply, the verdict represented an important victory for the U.S. EPA’s criminal enforcement efforts.
EPA officials hope the potential five-year terms that could accompany each of the 11 counts will send a strong message to penny-pinching authorities who put their own interests ahead of the people they are supposed to serve. But the victory is also bigger than that.
Two months into sequestration – when across-the-board budget cuts and staffing reductions are taking a toll on EPA’s criminal enforcement efforts – reminding environmental wrongdoers that the agency can still pack a punch may be more important than ever.
Doug Parker, the director of the agency’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID), acknowledged last week that limitations on new hiring and furloughs mandated by sequestration are making the thin green line of EPA special agents even thinner.
“There are areas where there were boots on the ground where there are no longer boots on the ground,” Parker said.
He declined to be more specific about where the holes in coverage have developed for fear of alerting the bad guys.
John McArdle, GreenwireA Glass Half Full
Although regulation has fallen on hard times, its historic accomplishments are unimpeachable. Especially when compared to the dire straits of countries that have industrialized helter-skelter without such controls – China comes first to mind – the United States has achieved minor miracles in ameliorating the worst outcomes of economic development. In fact, until the implications of worldwide climate change became manifest a decade ago, modest self-satisfaction was appropriate. Without any question, traditional pollution problems persist, including ground level ozone (smog) in most major U.S. cities, dead zones in great waters from the Chesapeake Bay to the Gulf of Mexico, toxic chemical exposure in the workplace, endocrine disrupters in the food supply, and hazardous imports from countries that do not have regulatory controls. But grit is gone from the air, workplace and foodborne illness deaths are down dramatically, and consumer products, from cars to lawn mowers, are much safer. Each aspect of this progress is attributable directly to regulation or to the efforts made by regulated parties to get out ahead of it.
Chapter 5 - The Environment
- Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- 28 November 2014, pp 149-182
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BP’s Macondo Well
The explosion of the rig was a disaster that resulted from BP’s culture of privileging profits over prudence.
Lanny Breuer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal DivisionThe immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling[T]he extent to which a company is a good social citizen is less a function of its managers’ moral compass than of their competence and perspective on what constitutes a good business model. … If they develop badly thought-out incentives and enforce them blindly, there will be unintended consequences, something the financial sector has illustrated on a grand scale in recent years.
Tom Bergin, Spills and Spin: The Inside Story of BPAfter nearly three years and tens of millions of dollars in investigation, the government needs a scapegoat. No one should take any satisfaction in this indictment of an innocent man. This is not justice.
Shaun Clarke and David Gerger, attorneys for Robert Kaluza, BP well site leaderThe Well from Hell
The gigantic derrick loomed 20 stories above the sea, the centerpiece of a $350 million, 30,000-ton drilling rig named the Deepwater Horizon. Stationed 49 miles offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, it was owned by the largest rig provider in the world, a company called Transocean, and leased by one of the biggest oil companies in the world, BP (formerly British Petroleum) for the princely sum of $1 million/day. Years earlier, BP and its partners, Anadarko Petroleum and Moex USA, had paid the federal government $34 million for oil and gas drilling rights to a nine-square-mile underwater plot named Macondo after the mythical village in the Gabriel García Márquez book One Hundred Years of Solitude. In a truly bizarre twist, BP had donated the opportunity to name the well to the United Way, which in turn sold it to a group of Colombians who were fans of the author and named the well to commemorate him.
7 - The Constitution and Our Debt to the Future
- Edited by Alyson C. Flournoy, University of Florida, David M. Driesen, Syracuse University, New York
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- Beyond Environmental Law
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- 05 June 2012
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- 26 February 2010, pp 145-170
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A New Breed of Public Law
CONGRESS GAVE BIRTH TO THE NATION'S MAJOR FEDERAL environmental statutes during a period of intense and extraordinarily fertile social upheaval, as America's young people struggled to reclaim their government and parents fought to recover their children's respect. The first generation of statutes, passed as the Vietnam War was winding down, launched a forty-year revolution in the way Americans treat their environment, propelling unprecedented advancements in pollution control and the preservation of natural resources. Yet somewhere along the line – it is difficult to pinpoint a single event or moment – this progress began to unravel. We learned that the environment of our country was irrevocably linked to the global environment and that frightening changes were under way in the atmosphere as an overload of fossil fuel and other emissions disrupted the planet's climate. The developing world was intent on catching up with the United States and Europe economically but lacked the regulatory infrastructure to moderate the impact of industrialization. Our country backed away from global leadership on environmental issues because energy producers convinced politicians that this role cost too much.
These fateful decisions could not have come at a worse time, as we are belatedly beginning to realize. The world confronts accelerating climate change, an environmental crisis that makes efforts to conquer previous challenges look like mere dress rehearsals.
PART II - TRANSPARENCY AND HONESTY
- Edited by Wendy Wagner, University of Texas, Austin, Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- Rescuing Science from Politics
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- 04 August 2010
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- 24 July 2006, pp 99-102
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The five chapters in this second part consider the next logical step in our mission to rescue science from politics: the challenge of ensuring that when science enters the policy-making arena, it is explained honestly, considered objectively, and used in a process that is as transparent as possible. The transparency principles state:
Researchers and those using their research must be careful to represent the findings accurately. When science is used for policy making, the limits of the scientific studies and judgments should be explicit so that the science does not serve as cover for underlying policy judgments. The data and methods of research that inform regulatory decisions must also be communicated honestly and expeditiously to the research community and broader public.
Researchers and those using their data must be honest about the limits of the research and remaining uncertainties. If others misrepresent research to suggest an outcome not supported by the study, researchers must correct these misstatements as soon as they become aware of them.
Research must never be dismissed or excluded because it does not provide a complete answer to a larger policy or science question. Research, by its nature, is incomplete, and to dismiss research because it does not provide a definitive answer could result in the exclusion of valuable science from regulatory decision making.
The data underlying a published study, as well as a comprehensive description of the methods, must be available to other scientists and the public at large upon publication of the study or submission of the results to a federal agency, in compliance with prevailing rules for preserving the privacy of human research subjects. Regulatory agencies should rigorously review and challenge exaggerated claims that underlying data must be kept confidential for business or other, however reasons.
Frontmatter
- Edited by Wendy Wagner, University of Texas, Austin, Rena Steinzor, University of Maryland, Baltimore
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- Rescuing Science from Politics
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- 04 August 2010
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- 24 July 2006, pp i-iv
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